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FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
Stephanie Riegg Cellini 
This paper provides a summary and analysis of the economics of the two-year, 
for-profi t higher education sector. I highlight studies that have contributed to our 
understanding of this sector and assess its social costs and benefi ts. I generate 
a rough estimate of the annual per student cost to taxpayers of federal and state 
grant aid, appropriations, and contracts fl owing to these institutions, as well as 
the cost of defaults on federally-subsidized student loans. I also estimate the out-
of-pocket educational expenses and foregone earnings of for-profi t students. I fi nd 
that for-profi t, two-year colleges cost taxpayers roughly $7,600 per year for a 
full-time equivalent student. Students bear most of the cost of their education, in 
the form of foregone earnings, tuition, and loan interest amounting to $51,600 per 
year. I contrast these costs with similar estimates for public community colleges, 
including the direct subsidization of the sector by state and local taxpayers. I fi nd 
that community colleges cost taxpayers more than for-profi ts — about $11,400 
per year — but students incur costs of only about $32,200 per year of attendance. 
Considering both public and private costs, community colleges are thus roughly 
$15,600 less expensive. For-profi t college attendance would result in net benefi ts for 
students if earnings gains exceed 8.5 percent per year of education, while students 
in community colleges require minimum earnings gains of 5.3 percent per year of 
education to reap positive net benefi ts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) set off a 
heated debate by alleging unscrupulous recruiting practices and fraud in the federal 
fi nancial aid programs at several large for-profi t colleges (GAO, 2010). In response, 
the Department of Education instituted controversial new rules which specifi ed that 
for-profi t institutions could maintain eligibility for federal student aid programs only 
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if their students met strict income-to-debt ratios and loan repayment rates (Federal 
Register, 2011).1 Although questions of for-profi t college cost and quality are central 
to the debate over the regulations, few empirical estimates of these measures exist. 
In this paper, I fi rst provide a summary and analysis of the economics of for-profi t 
higher education, highlighting studies that have contributed to our understanding of the 
sector. I focus on for-profi t institutions that offer two-year and less-than-two-year cer-
tifi cates and degrees, which comprise the vast majority of this sector. These institutions 
provide education and training to thousands of low- and middle-skilled workers every 
year and are the primary target of the Department of Education’s proposed regulations.
I next assess the social costs and benefi ts of the two-year, for-profi t, higher educa-
tion sector. I generate a rough estimate of the annual per student cost to taxpayers of 
federal and state grant aid, appropriations, and contracts fl owing to these institutions, 
as well as the cost of defaults on federally subsidized student loans. I also estimate the 
out-of-pocket educational expenses and foregone earnings of for-profi t students. I fi nd 
that for-profi t two-year colleges cost taxpayers roughly $7,600 per year for a full-time 
equivalent student, while students bear most of the cost of their education, in the form 
of foregone earnings, tuition, and loan interest amounting to $51,600 per year. I perform 
sensitivity analyses for variations in the most uncertain parameters. My estimates of 
the total costs to students and taxpayers of for-profi t education range from $52,000 to 
$65,000 per student per year. These fi gures correspond to total costs for the for-profi t 
sector of $14 billion to taxpayers and just under $100 billion for the 1.8 million students 
enrolled in these institutions each year.
I contrast these costs with similar estimates for public community colleges, including 
the direct subsidization of this sector by state and local taxpayers. I fi nd that community 
colleges cost taxpayers more than for-profi ts — about $11,400 per year — but that 
students incur only about $32,200 in costs per year of attendance. Considering both 
public and private costs, community colleges are thus roughly $15,600 less expensive 
per student per year than for-profi t colleges. In aggregate, taxpayers spend $75 billion 
supporting the 6.6 million community college students in the United States.
I also calculate the future earnings gains necessary to fully offset the costs to students 
and taxpayers in each sector. For for-profi t students, earnings gains of 8.5 percent or more 
per year of education would result in positive net benefi ts — a fi gure that is somewhat 
higher than recent studies of the returns to for-profi t institutions (Cellini and Chaudhary, 
2011; Turner, 2011). In contrast, students in community colleges require a minimum 
increase in earnings of 5.3 percent per year of schooling to break even. Thus, relative 
to community colleges, for-profi t higher education appears to be less expensive for 
taxpayers, but much more costly for students and society as a whole.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the economic research on for-
profi t colleges, highlighting studies that focus on the supply and demand for for-profi t 
 1 Under the new regulations, a program may lose eligibility for federal aid if fewer than 35 percent of former 
students are repaying their loans, or if recent graduates’ debt-to-earnings ratios are 12 percent more of 
annual earnings or 30 percent or more of discretionary income (Federal Register, 2011).
For-Profi t Higher Education: An Assessment of Costs and Benefi ts 155
education, the impacts of fi nancial aid policy, and student outcomes. Section III describes 
the data and the methodology of my cost-benefi t analysis, Section IV discusses the 
valuation of costs, and Section V describes the benefi t calculations. Section VI presents 
extensions and policy implications, while Section VII concludes.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION 
There is surprising little economic research on for-profi t postsecondary education 
given its prevalence. The primary reason is that few publicly available educational 
data sets explicitly identify for-profi t institutions and students. Nonetheless, new data 
sources and methods have led to signifi cant strides in our understanding of these insti-
tutions in recent years. In this section, I review the economic literature on for-profi t 
postsecondary education, highlighting what we know about these institutions as well 
as the gaps in the literature. I divide the literature into four broad categories: studies of 
the supply side of the market, focusing on for-profi t institutions; demand-side studies 
emphasizing student characteristics; research on fi nancial aid policy; and studies of 
for-profi t student outcomes.
A. The Supply Side: For-Profi t Institutions
Research on the institutional behavior of for-profi ts can be divided into two primary 
lines of inquiry: the size and growth of the sector, and competition between the public 
and for-profi t sectors.
Remarkably, generating a count of the total number of for-profi t institutions in the 
United States has eluded researchers until recently. The reason is that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education only tracks schools that are eligible for federal fi nancial aid programs 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act and, as recent research shows, this misses a 
substantial number of for-profi t institutions. Further, assessing the growth of the sector 
over time — even just the growth in aid-eligible institutions — was nearly impossible 
until recently because it was not until the late 1990s that the Department of Education 
made an effort to track down all aid-eligible for-profi t institutions (Cellini, 2009). This 
effort, as well as new data sources on non-aid eligible institutions, is for the fi rst time 
allowing economists to fully assess the size and growth of the sector.
Cellini and Goldin (2012) provide the fi rst comprehensive assessment of the total 
number of for-profi t institutions in the United States. Using data from the regulatory 
agencies of fi ve states, we fi nd that institutions that are not federal aid-eligible outnumber 
aid-eligible institutions. Overall, we estimate that there are 7,550 for-profi t institutions 
in the United States, serving 2.5 million students. Of these, 2,940 institutions and 1.8 
million students are Title-IV eligible and refl ected in offi cial Department of Education 
counts.
Deming, Goldin, and Katz (forthcoming) explore the growth of the sector. Focusing 
on federal aid-eligible institutions in the Department of Education data, they docu-
ment the tremendous growth of for-profi t education over the last decade. Enrollment 
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in aid-eligible for-profi ts now accounts for about 11 percent of all enrollment, up from 
just 4 percent in 2000. This growth is largely driven by chains and on-line institutions. 
Deming, Goldin, and Katz (forthcoming) report that aid-eligible for-profi ts currently 
confer 42 percent of all postsecondary certifi cates, 18 percent of associate’s degrees, 
and 5 percent of bachelor’s degrees.
Several theories regarding the growth of for-profi t higher education are explored in a 
chapter by Breneman, Pusser, and Turner (2006), in an excellent volume on for-profi t 
higher education edited by the same authors. On the supply side, the authors point 
to several innovations implemented in the for-profi t sector that have contributed to 
lowering the costs of education provision, allowing opportunities for greater profi ts. 
Examples include online learning, variable tuition pricing, and the use of non-tenured 
faculty. These supply-side innovations have allowed for-profi t institutions to capitalize 
on increased demand for education, particularly among older, non-traditional students, 
as they respond to labor market conditions and the rising returns to education and train-
ing over the last few decades. 
For-profi ts also appear to respond strongly to the demand for education among the 
traditional college-age population. In the same volume, Turner (2006) explores the 
differential growth of for-profi ts across states, fi nding a strong correlation between the 
percentage change in the population ages 18 to 24 and for-profi t growth rates. States 
like California, Colorado, and Arizona witnessed the largest growth in both college-age 
population and for-profi t enrollment between 1995 and 2000. Turner further details the 
distribution of degrees offered by for-profi t institutions by fi eld of study. As expected, 
public and non-profi t institutions offer a much higher percentage of associate’s and 
bachelor’s degrees in arts and sciences and liberal/general studies, while for-profi t 
degree programs are concentrated in business, health professions, engineering-related 
technologies, and computer science. She attributes the for-profi t focus in these areas 
on several factors, such as: skills in these fi elds are relatively easy to certify (e.g., 
through exams or job placement), practitioners are capable of teaching the necessary 
skills, physical plant requirements are minimal, and interdisciplinary training is not 
necessary for success.
Despite these differences in the proportion of degrees awarded in various fi elds, 
Turner (2006), Cellini (2009), and Bailey, Badway, and Gumport (2001) all document 
substantial overlap between the degrees and certifi cates offered in the for-profi t, public, 
and not-for-profi t sectors, particularly at the two-year college level. In California, for 
example, my previous work demonstrates that in most fi elds, including business, con-
struction, health, and technical trades, the number of associate’s degree and certifi cate 
programs offered in the for-profi t sector is roughly equal to the number of programs 
offered in the public sector in the average county.
The degree of program overlap drives another strand of economic inquiry that focuses 
on the extent and nature of competition between for-profi t colleges and other sectors. 
Bailey, Badway, and Gumport (2001) argue that although there is overlap between the 
degrees and certifi cates offered by public community colleges and for-profi ts, because 
of the small number of for-profi t schools and students, any competition between the 
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two sectors is negligible. Their contention is based on the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation’s data in the 1990s, and therefore undercounts the number of institutions and 
students; nonetheless, the numbers of institutions and students were still likely quite 
small. Moreover, their in-depth case study of a multiple-branch for-profi t school and 
local community college indicates that community college administrators generally 
do not view for-profi t schools as competitors. The authors conclude that the existence 
and success of for-profi t schools is not likely to exert a signifi cant negative effect on 
community college enrollment.
In Cellini (2009), I provide the fi rst causal evidence that public and for-profi t two-year 
(and less-than-two-year) colleges do, in fact, compete for students. I use a regression 
discontinuity design based on close votes on community college bond measures to 
control for unobservable tastes for education that may bias ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. My results reveal that when public community colleges receive increased 
funding and media attention with the passage of a bond measure, students switch from 
for-profi t colleges to community colleges, driving some for-profi t colleges out of the 
market. The magnitude of the effects in each sector are remarkably similar, suggest-
ing strong competition between for-profi ts and community colleges. The timing of 
the reaction also suggests that students may not have full information about two-year 
college options.
B. The Demand Side: Student Characteristics
An understanding of the demand side factors infl uencing the size and growth of for-
profi t education requires an understanding of the characteristics of the students attend-
ing these institutions and how these students differ from students attending public and 
non-profi t institutions.
Two studies in the 1980s fi nd that private two-year college students are more likely 
than public community college students to be women, minorities, and come from 
lower-income and less-educated families (Apling, 1993; Cheng and Levin, 1995). More 
recent studies suggest that these patterns persist (Bailey, Badway, and Gumport, 2001; 
Cellini, 2005; Chung, 2009a; Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person, 2006). Chung 
(2009b) uses a multivariate analysis of student-level data from the 1988 National 
Education Longitudinal Study to study differences in the characteristics of for-profi t 
students and those in other sectors. She fi nds that for-profi t students have less parental 
involvement in their education, higher levels of high school absenteeism, and are more 
likely to be young parents than students in other sectors.
Deming, Goldin, and Katz (forthcoming) corroborate the patterns found previously, 
exploiting new data on fi rst-time college freshmen from the 2004/09 Beginning Postsec-
ondary Students Longitudinal Study. For-profi t students in this sample are more likely 
to be female, black, and Hispanic relative to students in other sectors. Compared with 
those in community colleges, for-profi t students are disproportionately single parents, 
have much lower family incomes, and they are almost twice as likely to have a general 
education diploma (GED), rather than a high school diploma.
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All of the aforementioned studies rely solely on U.S. Department of Education data 
on students in institutions that are eligible for federal fi nancial aid programs. Student-
level data on ineligible institutions are not available, but studies based on more inclusive 
data, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, fi nd similar patterns of 
female and minority attendance. However, as might be expected, the more inclusive 
set of institutions reduces disparities in household income between for-profi t and com-
munity college students (Cellini and Chaudhary, 2011).
C. The Impact of Policy: Financial Aid
The biggest difference between for-profi t and public colleges is undoubtedly their 
price: required tuition and fees for public community colleges average just $2,136, 
while for-profi t, two-year colleges charge over $10,000 more, averaging $13,725 in 
2008–2009 (National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 2010). Because of their 
higher tuition, and due to the fact that aid-eligible, for-profi t institutions attract (or recruit) 
a large numbers of students who come from low-income families, for-profi t institutions 
receive a disproportionate share of federal student fi nancial aid under Title IV of the 
Higher Education Act. In addition, suggestions that the for-profi t industry is overly 
reliant on revenue from aid programs and allegations of fraud and abuse in fi nancial 
aid have plagued the sector and driven policy in the last few years (GAO, 2010; Federal 
Register, 2011). In light of these allegations, studies of the impact of fi nancial aid policy 
on student and institutional behavior are critical in developing sound public policy.
Deming, Goldin, and Katz (forthcoming) point out that for-profi ts account for 24 
percent of Pell grant disbursements and 26 percent of federal student loan disburse-
ments even though they enroll only 12 percent of students. Further, they point out that 
federal grants and loans received under Title IV of the Higher Education Act account 
for the vast majority of funding that these colleges receive. In 2008–2009, federal aid 
program accounted for 74 percent of the revenues of Title IV-eligible, for-profi t institu-
tions (Deming, Goldin, and Katz, forthcoming). 
In the fi rst quantitative study to address the relationship between fi nancial aid and 
for-profi t enrollment, Turner (2005) shows that Pell Grant recipients are more likely to 
enroll in for-profi t institutions than in public and non-profi t institutions in response to 
cyclical labor market fl uctuations. Specifi cally, she fi nds that as unemployment rates 
and public tuition rise, enrollments of Pell Grant recipients in for-profi ts rise, while 
enrollments decline with increases in state appropriations.
In Cellini (2010), I assess the impact of the federal Pell Grant program, the GI Bill, 
and California’s Cal Grant program on for-profi t college openings and closings. I ask 
whether the generosity of these programs infl uence the net number of for-profi t col-
leges in a market. I fi nd that for both Pell and Cal Grants, increases in the per-student 
maximum award encourage for-profi t college entry. The relationship is particularly 
strong in counties with high adult poverty levels, where more students are eligible for 
aid. This paper provides the fi rst evidence that federal and state fi nancial aid policies 
have signifi cant impacts on for-profi t college behavior.
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In more recent work, Cellini and Goldin (2012) test the “Bennett Hypothesis,” which 
suggests that the availability of federal fi nancial aid may induce some for-profi t institu-
tions to raise tuition above the cost of education. To answer this question, we compare 
the tuition in programs and institutions that are eligible for federal aid under Title IV 
against observationally similar programs that are not eligible. We fi nd that aid-eligible 
institutions charge about 73 percent more than similar ineligible programs, and this 
effect does not appear to be driven by differences in college quality.
Extending work on the relationship between fi nancial aid and enrollments in for-
profi ts, Darolia (2011) uses a dynamic regression discontinuity design to assess whether 
institutions that lose federal fi nancial aid eligibility experience lower enrollment and 
slower enrollment growth than similar institutions that narrowly miss cutoffs for eligibil-
ity for Title IV. He fi nds that enrollment levels and growth rates both decline substantially 
for schools that lose eligibility, and that these effects are particularly strong among for-
profi t institutions. Moreover, he fi nds that the effect is attributable to a decline in the 
number of new students rather than existing students transferring to other institutions.
D. For-Profi t Quality: Student Outcomes 
The issue of the quality of a for-profi t education is a central concern for both stu-
dents and policymakers. If for-profi ts institutions are providing high quality education 
to underserved students, then their reliance on federal aid may be warranted and even 
desirable. Conversely, if these institutions fail to provide benefi ts to students suffi cient 
to offset their costs, then public support through federal aid programs may be unjustifi ed.
Economic theory suggests that the best measure of education quality is the labor 
market return, or the growth in earnings, that can be attributed to a student’s education. 
Over the past half-century, an expansive body of literature has developed to measure 
the returns to education. Reviews of the literature by Card (1999), Ashenfelter, Harmon, 
and Oosterbeek (1999), and Kane and Rouse (1995a) report that one additional year of 
schooling causes earnings gains in the range of 6–9 percent, depending on the method, 
sample, and time frame of the analysis, while more recent and better identifi ed analyses 
reveal much higher returns, averaging 10–15 percent per year (Card, 2001; Goldin and 
Katz, 2008). The vast majority of the research in this area has focused on high school 
and four-year college returns, with relatively few studies emphasizing differences in 
various sectors and levels of schooling (Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek, 1999).
Very few studies have generated credible estimates of the private return to educa-
tion for for-profi t students. Three studies have generated cross-sectional comparisons 
of average earnings, rather than gains, of for-profi t and community college students 
(Grubb, 1993a;2 Chung, 2008; Deming, Goldin, and Katz, forthcoming). Chung controls 
for selection on observable characteristics and Deming, Goldin, and Katz implement 
propensity score matching, but none can control for unobservable student characteris-
 2 Note that a related paper (Grubb, 1993b), using the same data and methods to estimate returns to com-
munity colleges was found to be severely fl awed by Kane and Rouse (1995b).
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tics that might bias cross-sectional estimates. Nonetheless, these studies generally fi nd 
no or few differences in earnings between students in the two sectors. Conditional on 
employment, Deming, Goldin, and Katz fi nd no earnings difference, but when they 
include students with zero earnings, for-profi t students appear to have 8–9 percent lower 
earnings than students in other sectors.
In Cellini and Chaudhary (2011), we generate what we believe to be the fi rst causal 
estimates of the earnings gains to two-year private (mostly for-profi t) institutions. We 
use a student-level fi xed effects approach to control for time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics of students in the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We fi nd 
no statistically signifi cant difference in the returns to associate’s degrees and vocational 
certifi cates in private institutions relative to community colleges. Both sectors gener-
ate earnings gains of around 8 percent per year for students who complete associate’s 
degrees and do not continue onto four-year colleges.3 At most, point estimates, though 
insignifi cant, suggest that the earnings gains might 1–2 percentage points higher for for-
profi t students. Among students who attend for-profi ts but do not complete degrees, we 
fi nd returns of about 6 percent per year and no signifi cant differences between sectors.
Building on this work, Turner (2011) draws on income tax data to implement a similar 
student fi xed effects approach to assess the differential return to attendance in for-profi t 
and not-for-profi t institutions. Turner’s data allow him to look at older students and 
students in both two- and four-year institutions. His preliminary results reveal that earn-
ings gains are about 8 percent lower in for-profi ts, relative to not-for-profi ts. He obtains 
small negative, but imprecise, estimates of the absolute return to a for-profi t education.
Labor market returns are undoubtedly the central concern of economists studying the 
quality of education, but other student outcomes may reveal the mechanisms through 
which for-profi ts affect student earnings and shed light on the types of educational ser-
vices that are of most value in the labor market. Deming, Goldin, and Katz (forthcom-
ing) offer cross-sectional OLS and propensity score estimates of a host of other student 
outcomes. Conditional on observable characteristics, they fi nd that for-profi t students 
are more likely to default on student loans, are more likely to be unemployed, and are 
more likely to leave school because of “dissatisfaction.” Cellini and Chaudhary (2011) 
fi nd no discernable differences in the likelihood of being employed or being in full-
time employment across sectors. Much more research on student outcomes is needed, 
particularly on degree completion and transfer rates of for-profi t students.
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION
Despite the renewed research interest in for-profi t colleges, few academic studies have 
attempted to conduct cost-benefi t analyses in the sector.4 Early versions of Cellini and 
 3 If students in community colleges are more likely to transfer to four-year institutions, the returns to public 
sector education will likely be higher than the returns in the private sector. This possibility is a topic of 
future research. 
 4 There have been a few cost-benefi t analyses done by for-profi t colleges or consulting fi rms on their behalf, 
including de Alva (2010) and Shapiro and Pham (2010). 
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Chaudhary (2011) and Turner (2011) included rough estimates of the costs and benefi ts 
to students and/or taxpayers, but to date, there has been no comprehensive comparison 
of the costs of the for-profi t sector relative to the public sector. In the remaining sections 
of the paper, I provide such a valuation.
Several caveats are in order. First, I generally draw on the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation’s data on revenues, expenditures, and student aid. Therefore, my cost estimates 
only include the costs to taxpayers and students of aid-eligible programs in for-profi t 
colleges. Since these institutions receive all federal Title IV funds, which are a large part 
of the costs of taxpayer costs of for-profi ts, omitting non-aid eligible institutions will 
not impact my assessment of federal taxpayer support, but may cause me to understate 
the burden on state taxpayers if non-Title-IV eligible institutions receive substantial 
state aid.5 
Second, given the substantial heterogeneity in for-profi t colleges, I focus on comparing 
the costs of two-year for-profi ts with the costs of public two-year community colleges. 
I would ideally like to compare the costs of educating a student in an associate’s degree 
program in the two sectors, but the Department of Education data limits my analysis to 
institutions that offer two-year degrees as their highest degree.6 As such, many students 
in these institutions may actually pursue less-than-two-year degrees or certifi cates. 
Moreover, a large portion of students in for-profi ts classifi ed as four-year institutions, 
which are omitted in my base case analysis, are actually pursuing two-year degrees 
— but the same is not usually true for not-for-profi t and public four-year colleges. As 
a result, my estimates of tuition and debt may be understated. I consider students in 
four-year for-profi ts in an extension below.
Third, I leave out of my analysis any effects accruing to for-profi t institutions them-
selves. A true social cost-benefi t analysis should account for all costs and benefi ts 
accruing to these institutions (and there are undoubtedly large positive profi ts for for-
profi t colleges), but the relevant policy question is whether the benefi ts to taxpayers 
and students outweigh the costs to these groups.
Finally, I begin my analysis by evaluating the average costs associated with educating 
one full-time, full-year student for one year in a two-year, for-profi t college, relative to 
a baseline assumption that the student does not attend any other postsecondary educa-
tion. I carry out the same calculation — the costs and benefi ts for a full-time student 
relative to a baseline of no college — for a community college student for comparison. 
Of course, many, if not most, students in two-year colleges work while in school and 
attend only part-time (Scott-Clayton, 2012) and others may be unemployed, causing me 
to overstate the opportunity cost of attendance. However, as long as both community 
college and for-profi t two-year students are equally likely to attend part-time (Cellini 
2009), the differential costs between the sectors should be unaffected. Further, the full-
 5 In Michigan, for example, state grants can be used to attend non-Title IV eligible institutions (Cellini and 
Goldin, 2012).
 6 Due to substantial heterogeneity in the costs of various degree programs and majors, I would ideally like 
to compare the costs and benefi ts of associate’s degree programs in the same fi eld or major (e.g., allied 
health or computer science), but data on costs by program are not available.
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time calculation avoids assumptions (due to a lack of data) about the number of hours 
worked by students in each sector. Finally, given that I consider two-year programs, 




The most controversial aspect of the for-profi t sector is undoubtedly its reliance on 
federal student aid programs. To assess the cost of this support for both for-profi t, two-
year colleges and their public counterparts, I draw on data provided in NCES (2010), 
Table 355. I look separately at grant aid and loan aid, as grant aid goes directly to insti-
tutions and represents a direct cost to taxpayers, while loans (or more specifi cally, the 
interest on those loans) accrue to students, with the exception of defaults. I calculate 
the value of student loan defaults accruing to taxpayers separately.
A few details of the fi nancial aid calculations merit discussion. Since the NCES fi g-
ures of average grant and loan amounts are calculated only for aid recipients, I multiply 
the average awards accruing to each recipient by the percentage of full-time, full-year 
students receiving each type of aid (federal and non-federal, grants and loans) to arrive 
at estimated costs per student. I use these “effective” grant and loan amounts for all 
subsequent calculations (e.g., defaults and interest).
An additional complication is that grant aid is not listed separately for two-year, 
for-profi t institutions, but rather combines two-year institutions with four-year insti-
tutions. To better isolate aid amounts for for-profi t two-year institutions and in order 
to be conservative, I average the amount listed for “two-year and above” for-profi t 
institutions with the lower amounts presented for “less-than-two-year” institutions. 
The idea is that two-year institutions offer associate’s degrees as their highest degree, 
but both private and public two-year colleges also offer less-than-two-year certifi cate 
and diploma programs. It is also worth noting that a high percentage of students in 
four-year institutions actually pursue two-year degrees. To the extent this occurs, my 
calculations will underestimate the cost to taxpayers of two-year, for-profi t colleges. 
Grant aid is reported separately for two-year public institutions.
Federal grant aid includes all Title IV grants as well as programs administered 
through the Department of Defense and Veteran’s Affairs (e.g., GI Bill). As shown in 
the fi rst row of Table 1, under the base case (representing the most plausible values of 
all parameters), federal grant aid averages $2,376 per full-time-equivalent student in a 
two-year, for-profi t college. In the fi rst row of Table 2, the same value is calculated for 
 7 Completion rates may be different in the two sectors, and will be refl ected to some extent in the loan cal-
culations (e.g., students who do not complete will take out fewer loans and may be more likely to default), 
but this should not substantially affect estimates of the annual cost of education. On the benefi ts side, I 
avoid assumptions about completion by only calculating the minimum returns necessary to offset costs.
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public community colleges. Federal taxpayers pay $1,272 in grant aid for each student 
in the public sector. Note that all values are calculated as one-year values, so students 
attending for two years would cost taxpayers twice this amount.
Federal loans include Stafford, Perkins, and PLUS loans.8 In the base case, I use a 
35 percent default rate for for-profi t institutions. This fi gure refl ects the cumulative 
lifetime default rate over 10 years, as calculated by the U.S. Department of Education, 
based on the cohort of students entering repayment in 1997. For the public sector, in the 
base case, I use the analogous 10-year cumulative lifetime default rate of 26 percent.9
Table 1






 Federal grant aid 2,376 2,150 3,325
Federal loan defaults 1,854 440 2,712
Federal appropriations, grants, and contracts 1,736 1,736 1,736
Total federal taxpayer costs 5,966 4,326 7,773
State and local taxpayers
Non-federal grant aid (state, private, employer) 627 497 758
Non-federal loan defaults 873 214 1,245
State and local appropriations, grants, and contracts 171 171 171
Total state and local taxpayer costs 1,671 882 2,174
Students
Foregone earnings 26,550 22,150 30,900
Tuition, fees, edex,1 room and board (net of grant aid) 21,666 22,022 20,586
Interest on federal loans 2,332 1,985 2,678
Interest on non-federal/private loans 1,022 750 1,383
Total student costs 51,569 46,907 55,547
Total costs (students and taxpayers) 59,206 52,114 65,495
Total taxpayer costs (federal, state, and local) 7,637 5,208 9,948
Source: Author’s calculations using data from NCES (2010). See text for detailed explanation of 
calculations. 
1Educational expenses (“edex”) include books and supplies.
 8 PLUS loans are parental loans, but I attribute them to students for simplicity.
 9 The Department of Education spreadsheet can be downloaded from FinAid (2011). The 15-year default 
rate rises to 40 percent for for-profi ts and 31 percent for community colleges (as reported on fi naid.org, 
but not verifi ed with Department of Education data). Finally, two-year cohort default rates (based on stu-
dents, rather than loans) reveal rates of 12.5 and 8.4 percent for the for-profi t and public two-year colleges, 
respectively (available from the Department of Education). I use these values in sensitivity analysis.
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To monetize the impact of defaults, I multiply the average total student loan amount in 
each sector by the relevant default rate (one might interpret this as each student having 
a probability of default equal to the average default rate). I then multiply this fi gure by 
0.9, under the assumption that a student defaults on 90 percent of his total loan amount. 
I vary this assumption in sensitivity analysis.
I am able to separately identify average institutional aid in each sector: $38 for two-
year for-profi ts and $1,007 per full-time-equivalent in a community college, based 
on expenditure data (NCES, 2010, Tables 378 and 373, respectively). For for-profi t 
colleges, I subtract this amount from non-federal grant aid reported by NCES, which 
includes state, private, employer, and institutional aid, since the goal is to refl ect only 
T able 2




 Federal grant aid 1,272
Federal loan defaults   240
Federal appropriations, grants, and contracts 2,122
Total federal taxpayer costs 3,634
State Taxpayers
 Non-federal grant aid (state, institutional, private, employer)   776
Non-federal loan defaults 89
Expenditure per full-time equivalent (net of tuition, institutional aid, 
 federal and local appropriations)
4,337
Total state taxpayer costs 5,202
Local Taxpayers
 Local appropriations, grants, and contracts 2,551
Total local taxpayer costs 2,551
Students
Foregone earnings 26,550
Tuition, fees, edex,1 room and board (net of grant aid) 5,520
Interest on federal loans 80
Interest on non-federal/private loans 18
 Total student costs 32,169
Total costs (students and taxpayers) 43,555
Total taxpayer costs (federal, state, and local taxpayers) 11,387
Source: Author’s calculations using data from NCES (2010). See text for detailed explanation of cal-
culations. 
1Educational expenses (“edex”) include books and supplies.
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taxpayer and student costs in the analysis (i.e., I exclude profi ts and costs to for-profi t 
institutions). In Table 1, non-federal grant aid therefore includes only state, private, and 
employer aid. In Table 2, for community colleges, I leave institutional aid in the non-
federal grant aid calculation, since it accrues to taxpayers. However, to avoid double 
counting, I subtract institutional aid from total direct expenditures for community col-
leges (discussed below). For simplicity, I attribute the full cost of non-federal grant aid 
to state taxpayers, although some portion undoubtedly is covered by the private sector.
B. Direct Public Expenditures
Student aid is not the only mechanism through which taxpayers support for-profi t 
education. Data on for-profi t revenues refl ect sizeable federal, state, and local appropria-
tions, grants, and contracts (NCES, 2010, Table 369). As shown in Figure 1, outside of 
federal aid (which is captured in the “tuition” category in the fi gure), for-profi t two-year 
colleges report receiving a sizeable $1,736 per student from federal sources — more 
than three times federal support of community colleges. Support for for-profi ts through 
state and local appropriations, grants, and contracts amounts to another $171 per student 
(NCES 2010, Table 369). It is clear that these federal funds do not include student aid 
programs, but I can fi nd no other details on the programs and sources of this funding. 
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This fi gure may include funding secured through federal job training programs under 
the Workforce Investment Act and others.
To assess the degree to which the federal government, states, and local areas sup-
port public community colleges, I report grants and appropriations from each level, 
as revealed in NCES (2010, Table 362) and displayed in Table 1. I assume that local 
revenues include annualized per-student funding from voter-approved infrastructure 
bonds and other local sources.
Revenues, however, may not fully refl ect the costs to taxpayers of providing public 
education. I therefore include as a cost to state taxpayers the balance of expenditures 
per full-time-equivalent student (net of the federal and local revenue sources, counted 
above, as well as tuition and institutional aid). For community colleges, this balance 
amounts to $4,337 and includes instructional expenses (including salaries and wages), 
research, public service, academic support, student services, institutional support, opera-
tion and maintenance of plant, capital depreciation, auxiliary enterprises, and other items.
Figure 2 displays expenditures for both the for-profi t and public sector. Community 
colleges spend much more on instruction than for-profi t institutions ($12,000 vs. $4,000). 
For-profi ts spend more on student services, academic, and institutional support ($7,000 
vs. $4,000). Notably, for community colleges, total revenues and expenditures differ 
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only by about $840. Among for-profi t colleges, the difference is larger, suggesting a 
profi t of about $2,187 per student.10
Finally, one cost that I do not value for either sector is the cost of capital. For for-profi t 
colleges, one would want to account for rental costs, assuming that the institution is a 
traditional “brick-and-mortar” institution, rather than an online entity.11 For community 
colleges (which also offer a mix of brick-and-mortar and online delivery), the relevant 
capital cost is the opportunity cost of public land. One plausible approach to valuing 
the opportunity cost of public land is to use private sector rental rates, as these represent 
their best foregone alternative use (Boardman et al., 2011). For this reason, at least for 
brick-and-mortar classroom space, per-student capital costs may be comparable in the 
two sectors. Non-instructional facilities, such as gyms, pools, etc., may push the cost 
of capital higher for public institutions. However, operation and maintenance of these 
facilities is already included in my calculations of expenditures above.
C. Student Costs
The largest cost to students is undoubtedly the earnings they forego while in school. 
I assume, for simplicity, that the students enrolling in the private and public two-year 
colleges are demographically similar. To the extent that for-profi t students are more 
likely to be women and minorities, my calculations may overstate foregone earnings of 
students in the for-profi t sector. I address this in the sensitivity analysis below.
To calculate foregone earnings of full-time students in either sector, assuming they 
would have worked full-time if not attending,12 I average two sets of earnings from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I use the median weekly earnings of individuals age 
16–24 ($443 per week) averaged with the median earnings of individuals age 25 and 
over who have a only high school diploma ($618), since a high proportion of students 
in both sectors are non-traditional age.
Other costs to students include tuition, fees, educational expenses, and room and 
board. I draw on NCES (2010, Table 345) to obtain these costs for two-year for-profi ts 
($24,669) and two-year public institutions ($7,567) for students attending in-state 
institutions in 2008–2009. To avoid double counting, in Table 1 I report tuition, fees, 
educational expenses, and room and board net of effective grant aid, which is already 
attributed as a cost to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers.
Finally, since students largely rely on loans to pay for tuition and educational expenses, 
I include the interest paid on the average effective student loan amount (calculated as 
noted above by multiplying the average loan amounts by the percentage of students 
10 Note that I do not include for-profi t profi ts as a benefi t in my analysis, as the goal is to focus on taxpayer 
and student costs and benefi ts.
11 Institutions that exist solely online would have virtually no capital costs.
12 As noted above, I focus on calculating opportunity costs of full-time full-year attendance for simplicity, 
although I acknowledge that many students work while in school and attend part-time and others may be 
unemployed. My estimate will overstate the cost of foregone earnings for these students.
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taking out those loans) as an additional cost to students.13 For federal loans, I base my 
interest calculations on a 6.8 percent interest rate, the rate applied to both subsidized 
and unsubsidized federal direct Stafford loans in 2007–2008.14 I assume a 1 percent 
origination fee and repayment over 10 years. I use the student loan calculator available 
at www.Finaid.org to calculate the interest owed based on these parameters.15 For non-
federal loans, I apply a conservative 10 percent interest rate, based on the average of a 
typical range of 6.75 to 12.75 percent for private student loans (FinAid, 2011). Based 
on these calculations, for-profi t, two-year colleges cost students $3,354 in interest each 
year, compared to $98 for public sector students.
D. Base Case Cost Analysis
As reported in Table 1, in the base case, for-profi t institutions cost society about 
$59,200 per full-time equivalent student. Most of this burden falls on students, who 
incur $51,600 in costs, or 87 percent of the total. Foregone earnings are, of course, the 
largest cost of attendance for students, but tuition, fees, educational expenses, room and 
board, and the interest on loans used to pay these expenses, amount to about $26,600 
(or 52 percent of the total cost) for students in for-profi t institutions.
Taxpayers fund the remaining $7,600 in costs, of which 78 percent — or $6,000 — 
comes from federal sources. Federal student aid programs and loan defaults account 
for about $4,200 per student (70 percent of the federal funding). Federal appropriations 
and grants to institutions account for another $1,700.
Comparing for-profi t costs to public sector costs in Table 2, I fi nd that a community 
college education costs society roughly $43,600 per full-time equivalent student, or about 
$15,600 less than a for-profi t education. Costs to students amount to $32,200, almost 
$20,000 less than for their for-profi t counterparts. Net tuition, educational expenses, 
and interest are only about $5,600, or 17 percent, of the student’s cost, as the bulk of 
the cost to students is foregone earnings.
Taxpayers pay about $11,400 for a full-time equivalent student in a community col-
lege, about $3,800 more per student than for a for-profi t education. Of this total, state 
and local taxpayers fund the majority of community college expenditures, covering 69 
percent of the total or $7,700 per student. Still, federal taxpayers pay about $3,600 for 
a community college student, 42 percent of which comes through federal student aid.
13 It is also worth noting that, among those who do not default, the loan interest constitutes a transfer between 
students and taxpayers. I currently include it as a cost to students to measure the full cost of attendance 
accruing to students.
14 Interest rates on subsidized Stafford loans were lowered between 2008–2009 and 2011–2012, but they 
were increased back to 6.8 percent in 2012–2013. Interest rates on unsubsidized loans remained at 6.8 
percent throughout this period. Interest rates on PLUS loans are higher, around 8.5 percent. Depending on 
the mix of federal loans, interest rates could be slightly higher or lower, but overall, 6.8 percent appears 
to be reasonable average (FinAid, 2011).
15 The calculator also asks for a minimum monthly payment (I use the default of $50), the degree program 
(associate’s), and the number of years in college (2). With these parameters, the calculator assumes 120 
monthly payments of $68.63 (FinAid, 2011).
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Figure 3 reveals the difference in the total costs to taxpayer and student costs in the two 
sectors graphically. Figure 4 reveals differences by source of funding. Federal support for 
for-profi ts is much higher than for public sector institutions, but state and local funding for 
community colleges outstrips for-profi t support. Figures 5A and 5B break federal funding 
down into its components in the two sectors. Despite the policy focus on loan defaults in 
the private sector, these comprise only 31 percent of the federal spending on for-profi ts. 
In the public sector, defaults account for just seven percent of federal spending. Grant aid 
accounts for 40 percent of the cost to federal taxpayers, and appropriations, grants, and 
contracts account for the remaining 29 percent of federal support in the for-profi t sector.
E. Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of my assumptions, I re-calculate for-profi t costs under both a 
best- and worst-case scenario. I report these estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.
Under the best case scenario, I assume that for-profi t students have a lower oppor-
tunity cost of attendance than community college students. This may be the case, if, 
for example, for-profi t students are disproportionately minority, female, or young. I 
therefore use the lower of my two earnings estimates, the median for young people age 
16–24 ($443). This is conservative estimate, considering that the median earnings for 
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black women age 25 and over in 2008 was $480 per week. In the worst case scenario, 
I use the highest of my estimates, $618 per week.
One of the most uncertain parameters, and one that has a signifi cant impact on the 
analysis, is the percentage of students receiving loans and grants, which is used to calculate 
effective per-student aid costs. In the base case, I used the average proportion listed for 
“two-year or more” institutions and “less-than-two-year.” In my best case scenario, I rely 
on the lowest proportion listed for either of these two levels of education, in order to lower 
the burden on taxpayers to the lowest possible levels. In the worst case scenario, I use the 
highest proportion. Notably, a higher proportion of less-than-two-year students receive 
federal grants, presumably due to the inclusion of veteran’s benefi ts (72 percent vs. 60 
percent). But a much higher proportion of two-year-or-more students take out federal loans 
(93 percent vs. 69 percent). This proportion impacts all of the aid variables in the analysis.
I use two-year cohort default rates (12.5 percent) in the best-case scenario and 15-year 
cumulative lifetime default rates in the worst case scenario (40 percent). Finally, I vary 
the proportion of the student loan that is not paid back under default. In the best case, I 
assume 70 percent of the total amount, and I use 100 percent in the worst case.
As shown in Table 2, the results of analysis yield a best-case cost to society of $52,100 
and a worst-case cost of $65,500. Even under the best case scenario, the costs remain 
well above the base case community college costs of $43,600. Under the best case 
scenario, taxpayers pay only $5,200 per full-time equivalent students, compared to 














Federal Taxpayers State and Local Taxpayers
For-Profit        Community College
5,966
Figure 4
Annual Per-Student Taxpayer Costs of For-Profi t and Community Colleges, by Source
(Constant 2008 Dollars)
For-Profi t Higher Education: An Assessment of Costs and Benefi ts 171
about $9,900 under the worst case — still about $1,500 less than the taxpayer burden 
of community colleges.
V. VALUING BENEFITS
A. Private Returns to Education
The costs of both sectors, of course, need to be evaluated relative to their benefi ts. 
The most obvious benefi t for students and society generally is the gain in earnings that 
students experience as a result of their education. As noted above, very few studies have 
Figure 5A
Federal Support for For-Profi t Two-Year Colleges
Figure 5B
Federal Support for Community Colleges
























generated credible estimates of this private return to education for for-profi t students. 
At best, the research suggests the returns to for-profi ts are about 6 percent per year for 
students who attend with or without completion, which is similar to community college 
returns (Cellini and Chaudhary, 2011). At worst, for-profi ts may result in zero gains or 
even losses (Turner, 2011).
Rather than relying on either of these estimates, in Table 3, I instead calculate the 
magnitude of returns needed to offset student and taxpayer investments in for-profi t 
education under the base case costs described above. Assuming annual earnings of 
$30,900 (the average earnings of adults over age 25 with no college),16 a 30-year career, 
and a discount rate of 3 percent, I calculate the present value of lifetime earnings of an 
individual with no college to be $664,000. Comparing this to the $51,600 of student 
costs, a return of 8.5 percent return per year of education would be needed to fully offset 
the cost of one year of education incurred by the student. Including taxpayers in the 
calculation would require a 9.8 percent return. These fi gures are substantially higher 
than returns to for-profi ts estimated in Cellini and Chaudhary (2011), but they remain 
barely within the 95 percent confi dence interval.
The comparable fi gures for community college returns are considerably lower. Under 
the same set of assumptions, students in community colleges require a return of 5.3 
percent to offset their costs, while society requires a 7.2 percent return. These estimates 
are well below the returns to community colleges estimated in Cellini and Chaudhary 
(2011) and other well-identifi ed studies of public sector returns (Jepsen, Troske, and 
Coomes, 2010; Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan, 2005).
Table 3
Breakeven Return to Education for For-Profi t and Community Colleges
(Constant 2008 Dollars)
  For-Profi t Community College
Social Costs 59,206 43,555
Minimum return necessary to offset (%) 9.8 7.2
Student Costs 51,569 32,169
Minimum private return necessary to offset (%) 8.5 5.3
Assumptions
High school only earnings (no college) 30,900
Years of work 30
Discount rate 0.03
Lifetime earnings of high school only 605,654
Source: Author’s calculations using data from NCES (2010). See text for detailed explanation of 
calculations.
16 If for-profi t students typically make less than the average due to demographics, a higher return would be 
needed to offset costs. 
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B. Social Returns to Education
Although earnings gains, or private returns, are typically the largest benefi ts of college 
education, they are by no means the only benefi ts. The social returns to education refl ect 
externalities to human capital accumulation that benefi t other members of society in a 
number of ways.17 First, more educated workers may increase the productivity of those 
around them if, for example, less-educated individuals learn by interacting informally 
with better-educated colleagues. Second, more educated individuals may be less likely 
to engage in criminal behavior, saving substantial costs to society. Third, better edu-
cated individuals may be more engaged in civic life, leading to more informed voting 
behavior and better public policy.
The literature on social returns to education is much smaller than the literature on 
private returns. As is the case in studies of private returns, research on social returns 
must overcome a number of empirical challenges to generate plausibly causal estimates. 
A few notable papers have addressed these challenges. To assess the magnitude of 
productivity spillovers, Moretti (2004) compares similar industrial plants in cities with 
different proportions of college-educated workers. He fi nds that a 1 percentage-point 
increase in the share of workers with a college education results in a 0.5–0.7 percent 
increase in productivity, holding all else equal. Lochner and Moretti (2004) fi nd evidence 
that education reduces crime. They estimate the magnitude of the social savings from 
reduced crime to be 14–26 percent of the private return to education. Evidence on civic 
participation also reveals a strong link. Dee (2004) uses an individual’s proximity to 
two-year colleges (private and public) as an instrument for college attendance to assess 
the causal impacts of education on civic participation. He fi nds that college attendance 
increases voter participation by 17–22 percentage points.
Despite some credible evidence of social returns to college education generally, there 
are no studies that differentiate between the social returns to various types of colleges. It 
might be expected that education in the public sector generates greater civic participation 
as students become more invested in the fate of their college. For example, in Califor-
nia, voters routinely vote on bond measures to support infrastructure improvements in 
their local community colleges. Differences in productivity spillovers and reductions in 
crime between sectors are less obvious. Because of the lack of evidence, any valuation 
of differential social returns between for-profi t and public two-year colleges would be 
little more than speculation, so I omit it from my calculations.
C. Other Benefi ts
Beyond private and social returns to education, colleges may generate additional 
benefi ts to society outside of their educational services. Community colleges may have 
recreational or other facilities that are open to the public. For example, public colleges 
often offer low-cost or free access to gyms, athletic fi elds, pools, or libraries that may 
generate substantial value to the community. For-profi t colleges are less likely to offer 
17 See Moretti (2004) for an excellent review of this literature.
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reduced-cost services to the broader community, and may not even have recreational 
facilities or libraries. Additional societal value may be generated from faculty or student 
research, although this is not a traditional function of either private or public two-year 
colleges, and thus is likely to be small in both cases.
Expenditures on research and public service in the two sectors may provide an indica-
tion of the relative importance each sector places on these activities, but these values 
do not, of course, refl ect the willingness-to-pay for these services in the broader com-
munity. As shown in Figure 2, for-profi t, two-year colleges spend just $8 per student on 
research and public service combined, compared to $196 per student spent by commu-
nity colleges.18 Community colleges spend an additional $1,500 per student on capital 
(depreciation and operations and maintenance). Comparable values are not calculated 
by NCES for for-profi ts, but are included along with other expenses in a category called 
“other” that averages $1,200 per student. Again, these values do not refl ect the value 
to society of these facilities to the community, which may be a particularly important 
consideration for community colleges.
Another benefi t to society not previously discussed is the corporate tax revenue col-
lected from for-profi t colleges. Corporate tax receipts offset some portion of the cost 
to taxpayers of a for-profi t education. Accurate estimates of the per-student tax liability 
of for-profi t institutions are diffi cult to obtain, but cost estimates presented by the Uni-
versity of Phoenix suggest a corporate tax liability of about $625 per student (de Alva, 
2010). Projections of the tax liabilities of two-year colleges derived by consultants for 
Kaplan, Inc. suggest corporate tax revenues of $485 per student (Shapiro and Pham, 
2010). Including these (potentially overstated) estimates in the analysis would not 
result in a substantial change in my estimate of the taxpayer burden associated with 
for-profi ts and would do little to close the gap in the total societal costs between the 
private and public sectors.
Finally, to the extent that college attendance results in increased earnings, students in 
both sectors would also pay more in personal income taxes and be less reliant on public 
assistance. Apart from any distortionary effects, these taxes and subsidies represent a 
benefi t to society, but a cost to students: I therefore consider them a pure transfer in 
this analysis. Moreover, without more accurate estimates of earnings gains, it is unclear 
how taxes and public assistance would differ across sectors.
VI. EXTENSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Aggregate Estimates
The analysis thus far has focused on per-student costs and benefi ts, but an under-
standing of the aggregate costs to taxpayers and students of the for-profi t sector merits 
discussion. Title IV eligible two-year and less-than-two-year for-profi t institutions 
18 Note that for community colleges this amount is disaggregated: $190 per student is spent on public service 
and just $6 is spent on research. For-profi t college expenditures are not disaggregated.
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enroll roughly 624,000 students, based on fall enrollment counts. Using the fi gures 
calculated in the base case, this implies aggregate costs to society of $37 billion per 
year. As noted above, most of this cost accrues to students as foregone earnings, but 
taxpayers contribute $4.8 billion to two-year, for-profi ts annually.
If we assume that four-year college students accrue roughly the same costs as two-
year students, then we can extrapolate costs to the 1.2 million students in four-year 
for-profi ts. As noted above, since the four-year designation applies to the highest degree 
offered by an institution, many students listed as enrolled in four-year institutions are 
actually enrolled in associate’s degree or non-degree programs within those institutions. 
These students may face similar opportunity costs, and possibly similar tuition and debt 
levels relative to students in two-year institutions. To the extent that four-year students 
(including those in bachelor’s programs) pay higher tuition and assume additional debt, 
my estimates based on two-year college costs will underestimate the costs to taxpayers 
and students of these students.
Taking all 1.8 million students enrolled in federal aid-eligible, for-profi t institutions 
into account, I estimate total social costs at $106 billion, with $14 billion accruing to 
taxpayers and $92 billion to students. In contrast, the 6.6 million students enrolled in 
community colleges, together incur $214 billion in costs with taxpayers paying $75 
billion. 
To assess the plausibility of the for-profi t fi gures, it is useful to compare the taxpayer 
burden to spending on federal student aid programs. Offi cial reports of federal expendi-
tures on Pell Grants reveal that $4.3 billion was spent on students in for-profi t institu-
tions in 2008–2009 (U.S. Department of Education, 2011). In addition, GI Bill funds 
accruing to for-profi ts account for another $1.6 billion (U.S. Senate HELP Committee, 
2011). The remaining $8 billion difference is attributable to student loan defaults, a 
myriad of other grant aid programs, and the somewhat vague albeit large category of 
“federal appropriations, grants, and contracts” described above.
B. Policy Implications
In light of the vast amount of money spent by students and taxpayers on for-profi t 
colleges and the limited evidence of their effectiveness, it seems appropriate to consider 
whether further regulation of the for-profi t industry can be justifi ed. The U.S. Department 
of Education’s new gainful employment regulation will undoubtedly cause some for-
profi t institutions to close, but the magnitude of this effect is unclear. The Department 
of Education suggests that about 3 percent of aid-eligible for-profi t programs would 
lose eligibility (Federal Register, 2011), while opponents of the regulation suggest that 
7 percent (or more) would lose eligibility (Guryan and Thompson, 2010). It is not clear 
whether the analogous proportion of institutions would close, or whether some might 
continue to operate without Title IV eligibility (see for example, Cellini and Goldin, 
2012), making these impacts even more uncertain.
Further complicating analyses of this policy is the uncertainty regarding the extent 
to which community colleges could and would absorb students from the for-profi t sec-
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tor. If community colleges have the capacity to add students from the for-profi t sector, 
the gainful employment regulations may save students substantial costs, but require 
increased investment from taxpayers. On the other hand, some taxpayer savings would 
also result from the reduction in grant aid and loan defaults in the newly-ineligible 
programs. Still, it is not clear whether students in ineligible schools will be absorbed 
by community colleges or whether they will forego their education altogether.
VII. CONCLUSION
Research on the economics of for-profi t education is still in its infancy but, like 
for-profi t colleges themselves, the fi eld is rapidly growing. Over the last few years, 
we have learned much about the responses of for-profi t institutions to fi nancial 
aid and competition with the public sector, and have fi nally generated an accurate 
estimate of the number of for-profi t institutions in the country. We are beginning 
to learn about student outcomes, and have the fi rst few estimates of labor market 
returns.
Still, there are few data sources on for-profi ts, so estimation of the costs of a for-
profi t education remains a challenge, and defi nitively assessing its benefi ts is even more 
diffi cult. My estimates of the social costs of education in the for-profi t sector suggest 
that the costs to taxpayers of educating a student in a for-profi t institution are roughly 
$7,600 per year per student. Students incur annual costs in excess of $50,000 in foregone 
earnings, tuition, and loan interest in two-year for-profi t institutions. Although taxpayer 
costs are almost $4,000 higher in the public sector, the combined costs for students 
and taxpayers suggest that community colleges are roughly $16,000 per student per 
year lower than their for-profi t counterparts. To cover their personal costs, for-profi t 
students need to generate earnings gains of at least 8.5 percent per year of education. 
By comparison, community college students require earnings gains of only 5.3 percent 
to obtain net benefi ts from their education.
These fi ndings suggest that unless the private and social returns to for-profi t education 
can be shown to be substantially higher than the returns to a community college education 
— which the current literature does not support — then many students would be better 
off in lower-cost community colleges. Given the large tuition differences between the 
two sectors, the student savings that could be realized by a switch to the public sector 
appears to outweigh the greater taxpayer burden of public education.
This analysis, however, omits several important costs and benefi ts of for-profi t 
institutions, not least of which are their profi ts earned by for-profi t institutions. I also 
omit the social benefi ts of education and the externalities associated with research, 
public service, and the use of college facilities by the broader community. Further, 
state budget cuts may render community college expansion politically infeasible for 
the foreseeable future and changes to tuition and fi nancial aid programs will alter the 
estimates presented above. As the research on for-profi t education develops, more 
detailed assessments of the costs and benefi ts of a for-profi t education can and should be 
undertaken.
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